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War College: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

SINS OF OMISSION
Dallaire, Roméo. Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. New York: Carroll and
Graf, 2004. 562pp. $16.95

Interventions by the United Nations for
the purpose of establishing and maintaining peace have a mixed record.
Some have been reasonably successful,
such as in East Timor, while others,
such as Rwanda, have not. Roméo
Dallaire, the author, a retired lieutenant
general in the Canadian army, suggests
that efforts by the United Nations Security Council largely depend upon the
location of the problem area. East
Timor, just to the north of Australia
and on the flank of major shipping
routes, met the requirements. Rwanda,
in his opinion, did not.
Under the Charter of the United Nations, interventions may be governed by
Chapter 6, which stipulates that the
peacekeeping contingent is not to use
force but to separate the warring sides,
all the while maintaining a neutral
stance. However, under Chapter 7, UN
troops are authorized to use force to
keep the antagonists apart. Dallaire
speaks of a Chapter 6½, a hybrid of
the two without official UN sanction.
When the decision was made to send a
Chapter 6 mission to Rwanda, the Canadians, whose army had had considerable

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

experience in the peacekeeping field,
offered to provide a commander, some
of the staff, and logistic support.
Dallaire, who had recently been promoted to the rank of general and whose
tour in Canada had come to an end,
leaped at the opportunity to go to
Rwanda when the command was offered. Upon reporting to UN headquarters in New York, Dallaire was told that
his resources were limited and that the
mission had to be small. He was ordered to design the mission to fit those
parameters and not the demands of the
actual situation. A devout Catholic, he
was particularly interested in protecting
human life. Such commitment, not uncommon among military personnel, can
turn conventional wisdom on its head.
Belgium had acquired Rwanda from
Germany in the 1920 League of Nations
Mandate and in 1925 united it administratively with the Belgian Congo, which
lay to the west. Like most European
powers with colonial dependencies, Belgium staffed much of its governing apparatus with native civil servants—the
Tutsis—who for the most part were
better educated than other Rwandans
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and in many ways resembled Europeans. The Tutsis also captured the top
jobs in commercial enterprises. The
other principal tribe, the Hutus, were
not happy with this development.
When Rwanda achieved its independence from Belgium in 1962 and
promptly installed a Hutu-dominated
government, they were in a position to
exact revenge on the formerly elite
Tutsi population.
Many Tutsis fled to neighboring
Uganda, Burundi, and Zaire. The Tutsis
slowly gathered strength in those havens and developed (by African standards) a first-class army. By the early
1990s the Tutsi army was prepared to
invade Rwanda and install a Tutsi government. Threatened by the imminent
return of their enemies, the Hutus quietly encouraged the formation of vigilante groups to drive out or murder
remaining Tutsis, as well as moderate
Hutus. Matters had reached this stage
when Dallaire arrived in the Rwandan
capital, Kigali, in August 1993.
In addition to being the military representative of the UN, Dallaire was also
temporarily assigned the position of
political representative. When no one
was immediately assigned to replace
him in the latter post, the Canadians
should have sensed the general lack of
interest on the part of UN authorities.
Naive in the ways of the UN bureaucracy, however, Dallaire was optimistic
that he could perform his mission to
the fullest extent. Eventually, in late October 1993, the United Nations sent a
political representative with the somewhat improbable name Jacques-Roger
Booh-Booh, former Cameroonian foreign minister and a friend of the UN
secretary-general, Boutros BoutrosGhali. Interested primarily in the
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“perks” of the office, Booh-Booh was to
prove useless. Further, the forces provided for the mission (known as
UNAMIR, for United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda) were grossly
inadequate. Its troops, Ghanaian and
Tunisian, were brave, well trained, and
professionally led, but they arrived
without equipment. Pleas by Dallaire to
UN headquarters for equipment and logistic support from the major powers
fell on deaf ears. The United States,
Britain, and France had no interest in
the mission, although France did send
aircraft to evacuate Europeans caught
in Rwanda by the hostilities; requests by
Africans for rescue were denied.
Not long after Dallaire arrived, an informant in the Rwandan government
told him of weapon caches hidden by
the extremist militias. The general immediately requested permission to find
and destroy them but was refused on
the grounds that such action would violate the neutrality of the mission under
Chapter 6; nor was Dallaire permitted
to engage in intelligence operations. Instead, he was directed to identify the
informer to the Rwandan government.
Dallaire honored the order not to destroy the arms, but he refused to betray
the informant. In any event, the
source’s information soon dried up
when the futility of the situation became unmistakable.
The corruption of the extremist government authorities, the elimination of the
moderates, and the subsequent mass
murder, amounting to genocide, is too
involved to discuss adequately in this
review. Suffice it to say that approximately eight hundred thousand Africans—men, women, and children,
nearly all of them innocent civilians—
were killed, some after severe torture.

2

War College: Book Reviews
BOOK REVIEWS

Dallaire is especially hard on France,
Britain, and the United States for their
refusal to provide assistance or authorize the UN to take timely measures to
block the massacre. He attributes their
inaction in part to France’s other interests in the region (the president’s son is
said to have had business interests in
Rwanda) and to fear in the Clinton administration of another Somalia debacle.
(Although Dallaire does not mention it,
the Clinton administration’s lack of response was to have severe consequences
for the United States when Osama Bin
Laden interpreted its unwillingness to
act as American weakness.) Dallaire is
not easy on Canada either. He refuses
in his book to place blame on anyone
within the UN leadership; however, in a
later interview with a San Francisco radio talk-show host, Dallaire thoroughly
castigated Boutros-Ghali as having been
more responsible than anyone else for
the genocide.
Command of UNAMIR had profound effects on the Canadian general, among
them post-traumatic stress disorder.
When he was relieved and returned to
Canada, he was offered, and he accepted,
the number-two post in the Canadian
army. Haunted by his experience in
Rwanda, he retired before his term ended.
This is an excellent example of a good
and highly competent man deeply disturbed by international failures and the
Machiavellian tactics of world powers.
His experience with the United Nations
raises the question of how far a military
commander should go in honoring orders from civilian authority. The precedent of the Nuremburg trials provides
military officers with sanction to refuse
orders that would produce sins of commission. But what about the “sins of
omission”? There are no precedents,
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which arguably prevented Dallaire from
taking measures to block the genocide.
In the book’s preface, Dallaire recounts
how a retired army chaplain asked him
if he still believed in God after his African experience. His reply was “yes, because he had shaken hands with the
Devil.” The work has had wide success
in Canada but not as yet in the United
States. (The American reader should
note that morning or evening “prayers”
refers to staff consultations, not religious observances.) Shake Hands with
the Devil is an important book and
should be read by every military officer
and senior noncommissioned officer.
ROBERT C. WHITTEN

Commander, USNR (Retired)
Cupertino, Calif.

Record, Jeffrey. Dark Victory: America’s Second
War against Iraq. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2005. 205pp. $49.90

Jeffrey Record is one of the nation’s
most experienced and respected defense
analysts. His latest critique of the 2003
Iraq war, Dark Victory, provides many
important insights into the reasons for
the war and for its successes and failures. More generally, this work is a case
study of the challenges of transforming
military victory into a victory with
meaningful and lasting strategic impact.
In many ways this book focuses on the
critical difference between “war fighter”
and “war winner,” and on the fact that
conflict termination and its aftermath
are at least as critical as any phase of
battle proper.
Record, however, writes as a critic of a
war he does not believe in, and of a
nation-building process he sees as a
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nearly disastrous failure. His book is a
policy argument, not a dispassionate
analysis, and needs to be read as such.
There are also times when his focus on
the argument gets in the way of his
analysis.
Chapter 1, for example, contrasts the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 with the 1990–
91 Gulf war. It raises a number of valid
arguments about the difference between
the consensus building in the first war
and the somewhat unilateral nature of
the second, but it also implies that the
United States could have toppled
Saddam’s regime by extending the war
long enough to destroy the Republican
Guards or by some undefined actions to
support the Kurdish and Shi’ite uprisings. It does not really address the fact
that the U.S. and coalition forces were
even less prepared for stability operations and nation building in 1991 than
was the Bush administration for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
More importantly, chapter 1 raises
problems that as yet no analyst of war
and its aftermath has convincingly addressed for either Iraq wars or other
modern conflicts. Like the chapters that
follow, it does not discuss the practical
challenges in moving from limited war
to total war or the problems inherent in
the unpredictable nature of stability operations and nation building.
Record’s analysis of the failures of both
Bush administrations to deal with the
aftermath of military victory is remarkably insightful, but it is far from clear
that the postwar situation in Iraq was in
fact controllable or that a successful process of conflict termination and nation
building could have been put in place.
As Record points out in many other areas
of his discussion, the fact that the United
States is a superpower does not mean that
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severe limits do not exist on what it can
and cannot do; the broader question that
surrounds the current nation-building effort in Iraq is whether any such effort on
this scale can work.
This same issue pervades Record’s criticism of neoconservative ideology, theory, and practice in chapter 2 and
thereafter. It simply is not clear that
“realists,” pragmatists, or “neoliberals”
would ultimately be able to achieve lasting strategic success. Certainly, remembering the arrogance and failures of the
Rostow brothers (Walt and Eugene),
McGeorge Bundy, and Robert
McNamara, this reviewer had a horrible
feeling of déjà vu when reading through
Record’s discussion of the failures of
the policy makers of the George W.
Bush administration. The impact was
strikingly similar to that of the conclusion of George Orwell’s Animal Farm
(originally published in 1945): The leaders of the Bush administration’s war on
Iraq became difficult to distinguish from
the leaders of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations’ war in Vietnam. It also
became painfully clear that the aptness
of the phrase “lions led by donkeys” has
long outlived World War I.
Record’s analysis of the practical problems in how the administration has
handled conflict termination, stability
operations, and nation building is extremely useful. To know what needs to
be done right you have to know what
has been done wrong, and Record does
an excellent job of addressing the weaknesses in the “Bush doctrine,” the differences between Saddam Hussein and
Osama Bin Laden, the problems with
U.S. war aims, the rationale for the war,
and the failure to size or shape the invasion force for nation building. Record’s
critique may not be balanced or objective,
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but it is all the more useful for this.
Record presents a clearly defined thesis
that is to be rejected or accepted, and
that makes the reader focus on the major strategic issues of the war.
The last two chapters deal with the
“peace” that followed Saddam’s fall and
its broader implications for the future
exercise of American power. Anyone
interested in the transformation of the
U.S. military, future grand strategy, and
dealings with conflict termination
should read these chapters. One way or
another, the United States is going to
have to deal with such issues again and
again, as long as it is the world’s preeminent military power. Even if the United
States can eventually meet some definition of “success” in Iraq, it will still
have to deal with the lingering impact
of political and strategic mistakes that
Record describes so well at the end of
Dark Victory.
In short, this is a remarkably insightful
book, one that raises precisely the issues
that need to be resolved when assessing
the Iraq war and shaping an American
strategic posture for the future.
ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

Burke Chair in Strategy
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Ganor, Boaz. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A
Guide for Decision Makers. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction, 2005. 334pp. $39.95

Among a cacophony of authors on terrorism writing since September 2001 is
a small but refreshing group who offer
specific, pragmatic, and tested solutions. Boaz Ganor joins this select few
with a book aptly subtitled A Guide for
Decision Makers. Ganor splendidly
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captures inescapable fundamental
truths. First, defining terrorism is
fraught with politics, emotion, and legal
quandaries; however, the world must
reach a consensus in order to move toward solutions. Second, democracies
are uniquely vulnerable to terrorism,
and they are struggling with the question of whether to treat terrorism as a
crime or as a method of war. Third, efforts to counter terrorism must be
multigenerational. Finally, decision
makers can and must take steps to inoculate society against the effects of terrorism, through a comprehensive
education campaign.
This book is based on Ganor’s doctoral
dissertation, Israel’s Counter-Terrorism
Strategy, written for the Hebrew University. Israel is the only liberal democracy in
the Middle East. Using the Israeli model,
Ganor observes that democracies are
uniquely vulnerable to terrorism where
government must defend itself yet maintain principles of transparency, rule of
law, and representative governance while
remaining mindful of world opinion.
Ganor explores ten explicit dilemmas that
face democratic nations: defining the
threat; defining counterterrorism; employing intelligence; deterrence policy;
choosing offensive and defensive actions;
public opinion and ethics; legislative and
punitive policies; media coverage; damage
to societal morale; and finally, dilemmas
concerning international cooperation.
Ganor warns that if terrorism remains a
subjective concept influenced by one’s
point of view, solutions will be similarly amorphous. Without consensus
on the definition of what constitutes
terrorism, global efforts to defeat it
will fail. Ganor begins with a well considered definition of terrorism, including a rigorous analysis of why
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definitions matter. “Terrorism,” he
writes, “is a form of violent struggle in
which violence is deliberately used
against civilians in order to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious).” Ganor
offers three elements upon which his
definition relies. Violence is a key factor;
it eliminates nonviolent protests,
strikes, and tax revolts from discourse
on terrorism. The goal is always political (e.g., to change the form of governance, to revise economic or social
policies). Finally, if an act is to be called
terrorism, its targets must be civilians.
Terrorism does not include random injury inflicted on civilians who happen
to find themselves in areas of conflict; it
is, rather, violence intentionally and
specifically directed at civilians.
One of the many unique strengths of
this book is its personal interviews with
pivotal Israeli authorities. These include
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon; former
prime ministers Yitzhak Shamir, Shimon
Peres, and Benjamin Netanyahu; a former adviser, Rafi Etan; former members
of Mossad Meir Degan and Shabtai
Shavit; a former member of Shin Bet,
Yaakov Perry; and former defense minister Moshe Arens. These sources and
others of equal prestige give Ganor unprecedented insights into the heart of
Israeli decision making. This book is an
authoritative accounting of Israel’s
struggle against terrorism. However,
Ganor’s exclusive analysis of the Israeli
experience is also a weakness.
Without question, the Israeli government and citizens have endured a level
of deadly terror unprecedented in modern times. Israelis are sought worldwide
as experts on airline security, physical
security, and intelligence. Yet often
there is global criticism of Israeli methods
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for dealing with terrorism. Israel swirls
dizzyingly in a historical, emotional,
and political whirlpool that shapes the
opinion of those who live outside its
borders. Putting politics aside, the discerning reader is offered a practical
analysis of how a liberal democracy is
seeking a win-win-win scenario against
terrorism by maintaining a domestic
moral conscience based on rule of law,
response to a critical international audience, and insistence on keeping terrorism
from “affecting the public’s day-to-day
affairs and the essence of life in Israel.”
Another fascinating discussion concerns the power of education as a tool
of counterterrorism. According to
Ganor, Netanyahu advocated strengthening public resistance to the corrosive
effects of terrorism through education
designed to inoculate the population
against the impulse to give in to protracted terrorist pressure. In 1997 the
Herzilya-based International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism started
an aggressive program of lectures and
educational activities aimed at strengthening the Israeli public’s ability to cope
with terrorism. Ganor asserts that public education contributes to solutions
by reducing the fear and paralysis that
terrorism can cause. Furthermore, public information, particularly in a liberal
democracy, reinforces trust and disarms
terrorists, who seek to undermine society’s stability.
Perhaps the most stunning revelation in
the book comes in the final chapter, as
Ganor says, as did most Israeli policy
makers whom he interviewed, “Israel
does not have—nor did it ever have—a
written, structured and unambiguous
counter terrorism policy.” What then,
were the underlying principles by which
decisions were made across numerous
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political administrations? Why does the
Israeli experience offer solutions for a
way ahead? The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle provides the answers.
To paraphrase the author, the book is
intended to serve as a guide to the perplexed, a tool for decision makers at all
levels of government, industry, military,
police, academics, and the public at
large. Ganor succeeds in this intention.
The book is highly recommended for all
readers in his intended audience.
JEFFREY H. NORWITZ

Naval War College

Sheehan, Michael. International Security: An Analytical Survey. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
2005. 199pp. $49.95

National security students and practitioners commonly dive into esoteric debates on the merits of various grand
strategies and foreign policies, having
spent little or no time pondering the
contemporary meaning of the term that
drives the discussion—“security.”
Michael Sheehan, professor of international relations at Swansea University in
the United Kingdom, and author of a
number of authoritative texts on related
subjects, was driven to write this book
by a felt need to shed more light on this
“contested concept.” International Security does an admirable job of illustrating the myriad ways in which scholars
have used the term since the advent of
the discipline. More significantly,
Sheehan offers thoughtful commentary
on how contemporary scholars should
take into account new forces in international relations that demand broader
thinking on “security.”
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The book’s main challenge is to develop
some consensus as to what constitutes a
security issue. If considered broadly,
anything that affects the well-being of
humans might be included, but so inclusive a discourse might be meaningless.
Sheehan sides with those who propose to
limit the debate to the human-inspired
dangers of a life-threatening nature to
collectives. Thus all traditional military
threats are counted, along with global
warming (but not earthquakes) and the
Kosovo genocide of 1999 (but not the
disappearance of the Gaelic tongue).
This system works.
After a clear and understandable discussion of security as initially set forth by the
realist school of international relations,
Sheehan devotes a chapter to each of the
elements of what he calls today’s “broader
agenda” of security: security communities, economic, societal, environmental,
gender, postmodern, and critical security.
In each case, he draws on the seminal articles and arguments for each element
and then offers his personal critique of
what each adds to the debate.
Sheehan makes it clear that all of these
schools are reactions to realism and
that each new element of the “broader
agenda” offers its antidote to the traditional perspective of viewing states,
rather than individuals, as the consumers of the benefits of security. However,
he insightfully shows that each element
itself has an element of realist thinking.
That is, ameliorating the tensions
caused by intrasocietal (tribal) rivalries
not only reduces danger to the people
but also advances the relative power of
the state by showcasing its stability. The
case is equally well made for economic
and environmental policies. Sheehan is
at his best, however, when he illustrates
in each chapter how these new topics go
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beyond this obsession with the state
and military power and contribute to
the development of what is now commonly called human security.
Unfortunately, many of his observations and conclusions are both obvious
and repetitive. He chides the realist
(and neorealist) school in nearly every
chapter of the survey for being mesmerized by the military, statist, and power
correlates of security. The first of his
several suggestions that the world had
changed markedly since the end of the
Cold War should have sufficed. His thesis that individuals as well as states
must be the referents of security can be
found in every chapter.
While the book has an academic tone
and is well footnoted, it remains readily
digestible for the layman. It is particularly well suited for midcareer national
security professionals embarking on the
study of national security issues, since it
will induce them to develop personal
interpretations of the meaning of international security. Our national security
establishment needs more of this.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Moore, John Norton, and Robert F. Turner. National Security Law, Second Edition. Durham, N.C.:
Carolina Academic, 2005. 1,424pp. $110

In 1990 John Norton Moore and Robert
F. Turner, along with Frederick S.
Tipson, published a National Security
Law casebook covering a “new field in
American law and legal education,” a
work designed for “use in law schools,
advanced degree programs in international relations and national security,
and the nation’s war colleges and
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service academies—as well as to serve as
a handy desk reference for professionals
and practitioners.”
Since the publication of that first edition the U.S. national security landscape
has undergone a radical transformation. Over the last fifteen years the
United States has been to war in the
Persian Gulf, Europe, and Afghanistan.
Moreover, the world has witnessed
mass executions in the name of ethnic
strife in Africa and Europe, the onset of
the “information age,” the rise of China
as a military and economic power, an
increased proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and a tremendous
surge in non-state-sponsored terrorism.
Perhaps the most critical turning point
relevant to U.S. national security law was
11 September 2001, when the radical
Islamist terrorist group al-Qa‘ida killed
thousands of American civilians. The resulting U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism has redefined how Washington and
Americans view national security.
Not surprisingly, the turbulent nature of
the post–Cold War and post-9/11 eras led
to a significant evolution in the now established field of national security law.
Moore and Turner have gone to great
lengths to create in the second edition of
National Security Law an up-to-date casebook that covers not only the fundamentals of national security law but also new
areas in the law that are burgeoning as we
enter the twenty-first century. The authors have assembled some of the world’s
leading experts in their respective fields of
law and policy. Most notably, they place a
clear emphasis on national security issues
that have arisen in the post–Cold War
era. In addition to adding several new
chapters, such as “Domestic Terrorism,”
“Information Warfare,” “Homeland Security,” “Outer Space Law,” “Drugs as a
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National Security Issue,” and “Operational Law,” Moore and Turner have deleted material that was more relevant to
the Cold War. Additionally, many other
chapters have been revised and updated
to reflect important advances in national
security law and policy.
Perhaps what sets this casebook apart
from others in the genre is its extensive
scope. Its thirty-two chapters cover not
only “some of the central public preoccupations of our time—military force, arms
control, free speech, and terrorism—
but also a number of more esoteric corners of the law,” which at times have
gained wide attention and scrutiny. Indeed, every conceivable aspect of national security law and policy, from
“The Use of Force in International Relations: Norms Concerning the Initiation of Coercion” to “War Crimes and
Tribunals” to “The Control of International Terrorism” and “Immigration
Law and National Security,” is included.
The second edition of National Security
Law sets the standard in its field and
will no doubt facilitate “an interdisciplinary understanding” of what Moore
and Turner “believe to be one of the
most important public policy developments now facing the nation.” Without
question, Moore and Turner have succeeded in producing a comprehensive,
well organized, extremely well written
casebook filled with seminal cases, insightful commentary, and stimulating
questions for discussion. National Security Law is likely to rapidly become a
staple at law schools and advanced degree programs across America and will no
doubt be relied on by scholars, students,
and practitioners for years to come.
SEAN P. HENSELER

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
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Hook, Steven W. U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox
of World Power. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 2005. 487pp. $54.95

Steven Hook’s textbook of American
foreign policy offers a sweeping array of
issues that put contemporary American
politics in clearer perspective. The preface lays out this paradox: the very
sources of American strength have increasingly become sources of vulnerability, among them a sclerotic bureaucracy
that cannot “effectively manage the dynamic world order that, to a considerable extent, is of its own making.” For
Hook, the United States is threatened
by forces such as globalization, which it
so vigorously promoted and which gave
it strength. This work explores the impact of this paradox on the process of
making U.S. foreign policy.
The book examines the setting of U.S.
foreign policy, touching on the rise of
American power and on various views
and theories of how decisions are made.
It then explores the governmental
sources of foreign policy, including the
various branches of government and
the bureaucracy, and nongovernmental
sources of foreign policy, such as public
opinion, interest groups, and intergovernmental organizations. Finally, it examines policy, including defense and
economic statecraft, and transnational
problems such as population growth,
global warming, and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. The result for the reader is a good understanding of contemporary American
foreign policy.
Hook offers interesting point-counterpoint debates on subjects ranging from
the realist-liberal debate on war to nuclear deterrence versus just war. There
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are also sections in which such figures as
Fidel Castro, Ted Koppel, and Theodore
Roosevelt speak in their own words, as
well as many useful graphs and tables
that clearly illustrate important developments in world politics. The extensive glossary should prove very helpful.
No book, alas, is without its shortfalls,
and I offer two. First, Hook works with
a theme; he puts forth an argument
about the current state of American affairs and shapes his textbook around
it. It is an interesting theme and a
good tool for learning, but because
textbooks are often devoid of editorial
comment, in this one argument may
pass as fact. Overall, the approach is
effective, but teachers will need to emphasize to their students that the book
is thematic.
Second, the scholarship needs updating
in certain sections—for instance, in the
discussion of cognitive psychology and
decision making. It is true that much of
the important literature in this area is
dated, and that a book of this kind
should not overwhelm the student.
However, more could have been done
to incorporate new work.
Overall, this is one of the best texts on
American foreign policy. Hook, an associate professor of political science at
Kent State University, has a strong record of publication on this subject and is
a veteran textbook author. This work
will be of interest not only to college
students but also to members of the
Naval War College community. While
it is not yet clear that the United States
is caught in a grand paradox the likes of
which Hook addresses, it is certainly a
vital, even defining, theme to consider,
and one that he frames effectively. Certainly, it is an issue with which
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students, scholars, and policy makers
will be grappling in the coming years.
STEPHEN YETIV

Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Va.

Carpenter, William M., and David G. Wiencek,
eds. Asian Security Handbook: Terrorism and the
New Security Environment. 3rd edition. New York:
M. E. Sharpe, 2005. 365pp. $84.95

In March 2005 Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld released The National
Defense Strategy of the United States of
America. In the foreword Rumsfeld
sends a clear message about America’s
security concerns: “We live in a time of
unconventional challenges and strategic
uncertainty. We are confronting fundamentally different challenges from
those faced by the American defense establishment in the Cold War and previous eras. The war on terrorism has
exposed new challenges, but also unprecedented strategic opportunities to
work at home and with allies and partners abroad to create conditions favorable to a secure international order.”
Indeed, as witnessed by the summer
terrorist bombings in London and earlier attacks in Madrid and Bali, countering these deadly “unconventional
challenges” requires imaginative thinking and expert geopolitical knowledge.
The Asian Security Handbook: Terrorism
and the New Security Environment aims
to assist in meeting these challenges in
the Asian setting.
The Asian Security Handbook, strongly
reflecting the post-9/11 environment,
presents a series of political and security
assessments of twenty-three Asian countries. True to its subtitle, the editors
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begin with an excellent chapter on terrorism, which includes thoughtprovoking photos, maps, and a figure
depicting the “Southeast Asia terror
network.” Noting that today’s threats
come in a myriad of identities, Carpenter
and Wiencek include insightful discussions on “security issues and trends independent of the events of September
11.” This section includes well crafted
assessments on piracy, U.S.-Chinese
strategic competition, and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). The detailed
tables on piracy and WMD developments in Asia are also very helpful.
Our electronic media, the latest information erupting fast and furious from
computers, radio, and television, create
relevance and timeliness issues for any
traditionally published reference material. Lengthy publication time lines and
the ever-changing international situation exacerbate the problem. Here, the
Asian Security Handbook shows both
value and weakness. The chapter on terrorism addresses events well into 2004.
The authors ask the right questions and
present thoughtful arguments that
should stand the test of time. The information in many of the country-profile
chapters, written by a wide range of
government, academic, and privatesector specialists, is more dated. Indeed,
a quick review discloses that most of
these articles are supported by sources
written no later than 2003. The section
on Japan has a mere two endnotes, citing publications of 2001 and 2002. Perhaps more alarming is the coverage on
Singapore, which consists of only five
pages of text (Brunei is allotted thirteen
pages), no endnotes, and just three
dated suggested readings. Surely Singapore deserves much more attention.
Also, the seventeen contributing
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authors, while most welcome for their
diverse viewpoints, represent a wide
range of writing and research abilities.
The coverage on China, for example, is
divided into brief, mostly unsupported
statements of questionable consideration
and depth. Subtitles range from “Spies”
to “Farmers, Rural Areas.” (The introductory chapter’s discussion on China,
although brief, is much more useful.)
The style is similar to that of a U.S.
Army area handbook, and there are but
three endnotes; two are official U.S.
government publications, the other a
Chinese government website. Other
country profiles, such as that on India,
are more polished, scholarly, and
thorough.
Is the Asian Security Handbook a useful
reference? The U.S. national defense
strategy sets forth a plan to defeat
America’s adversaries by “countering
ideological support for terrorism,” or
CIST. CIST—and how it can be used—
has quickly become a hot topic within
Department of Defense professional
military education circles. Clearly, academic courses that provide students
with a greater knowledge of our incredibly diverse world, including relevant
languages, culture, economic, and political factors, are key components in the
building of sorely needed understanding
and expertise. Unquestionably, Asia is a
critical area for study and assessment,
and the Asian Security Handbook provides the nonspecialist with a single reference for most of it. While the writing
and timeliness are uneven, the Asian Security Handbook presents a starting point
for those interested in studying this critically important region.
TIMOTHY N. CASTLE

Naval War College
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Hersh, Seymour. Chain of Command: The Road
from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. 394pp. $36.95

Seymour Hersh continues with his latest work his journey as a man with an
agenda. Released in September 2004, it
is a compilation of articles published in
The New Yorker, with additional information intended to present a congruent, as well as compelling, story about
the Bush administration’s efforts to
wage a worldwide war on terrorism.
That Hersh is a fan neither of the president and his closest aides nor of the
Iraq war is made abundantly clear from
the opening pages. As a consequence,
Chain of Command has drawn heavy
criticism from those who are either administration loyalists or ideologically
supportive of the Global War on Terror
despite its unconventional and violent
nature. Conversely, the president’s political opponents and others who oppose war on any number of grounds
have heralded Hersh’s book as the latest
efforts of a quixotic protagonist sworn
to bring truth into the light. The former
have assailed the book for its perceived
inaccuracies and lack of credible
sources, while the latter have lauded it
for exposing programs and decisions
that appear inimical to deep-seated
American beliefs about decency and
honesty.
This book is clearly a polemic, intended
to draw attention to Hersh’s concerns
over what he sees as an abuse of power
at the highest levels of a government
seemingly obsessed with a vision for
Iraq and its Muslim neighbors that may
be out of step with traditional American ideals. Whether you agree or disagree with Hersh’s assessments and
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conclusions, Chain of Command is a
work every serious student of U.S. national security should read, because he
raises important fundamental and
somewhat disquieting questions: Who
is ultimately accountable for the prisoner abuses that occurred at Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay? What are
the moral and ethical obligations of
those in uniform to adhere to international norms of behavior when national
guidance appears at odds with, if not in
complete contradiction to, accepted
global standards?
Hersh also challenges his readers to
contemplate the effects of the secretary
of defense’s domination over the military conduct of the war on terror and
its ramifications on the future of civilmilitary relations. Secretary Rumsfeld
bent the military to his will in almost
every phase of the war on Iraq, with what
Hersh describes as disastrous results
both in Iraq (where an insurgency rages
on) and in the greater war on terror (in
which the architect of 9/11 remains
free). The reader is left to contemplate
what the obligations of senior military
leaders were and why they were not
more effective in making their voices
heard on strictly military matters. Further, what salient ethical issues arise
from jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations of the Iraq war?
Hersh reserves much of his vitriol for
the Bush administration’s handling of
the intelligence used to justify war on
Iraq. In a chapter titled “Who Lied to
Whom?” he recounts much of what has
come to light about the way intelligence
was “manipulated” to build a case. For
Hersh, the inability of U.S. intelligence
organizations to collect accurate intelligence about Iraq and al-Qa‘ida is nearly
as egregious as the manner in which
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that intelligence was analyzed and interpreted. He is clearly disturbed by the
apparent usurpation of national intelligence activities by the Department of
Defense. The reader is left with the nagging suspicion that further such consolidation may not be in the best interests
of the country’s leadership, since opposing opinions already appear to have
no voice.
Hersh concludes Chain of Command by
posing a troubling set of questions. “How
did eight or nine neo-conservatives who
believed that a war in Iraq was the answer to international terrorism get their
way? How did they redirect the government and rearrange long-standing
American priorities and policies with so
much ease?” Discerning readers must
look past the author’s bias and answer
for themselves. While it is arguable
whether this book will earn the stature
of My Lai 4, Hersh succeeds in confronting us with important questions
that force us to look harder at ourselves
and our country.
RON RATCLIFF

Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Naval War College

Pierce, Terry C. Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation. New York: Frank
Cass, 2004. 265pp. $115

Captain Terry Pierce is a serving naval
officer who has studied innovation at
the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, under the supervision
of Stephen Rosen. This book appears to
be the author’s dissertation, written as
part of a series on strategy and history
edited by Colin Gray and Williamson
Murray.
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Beyond that, nothing about this book is
clear or straightforward, including the
title. The title leads one to think that
the book will examine how revolutionary technologies have transformed warfare, but the subtitle, “Disguising
Innovation,” should serve as a warning—nothing is as it first seems. This
work is a sociological study of how the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have
achieved what the author terms “disruptive innovations” (new ways of
combining technologies that create new
forms of warfighting) and sustaining
innovations (those that improve existing forms). Technology plays a distant
second fiddle to doctrine. Pierce’s major thesis is that the catalysts for disruptive innovation are senior military
officers. How these officers manage the
disruptive innovation process is key. He
shows that they establish small groups
to define the tasks that must be carried
out to conduct a new form of warfare,
ensure that like-minded officers are
promoted, and most intriguingly, disguise the disruptive innovation as
merely improvements to existing
modes, in order to avert ruinous opposition from entrenched interests. In
support of his thesis Pierce offers a
number of case studies, including amphibious warfare, Japanese and American carrier warfare in World War II,
and Marine maneuver warfare. A nice
twist is the inclusion of more recent
case studies like surface-land-attack
warfare and the Tactical Collaboration
Network.
After a promising first chapter in which
the author generally defines his terms
and surveys the existing literature on
disruptive innovation, however, comes
a nearly disastrous attempt to establish
a theoretical framework to support the
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analysis of the following case studies.
Chapter 2 is almost unreadable, apparently due to the failure of anyone actually to read or edit it. Apart from turgid
and sloppy language, the chapter’s most
egregious defect is the author’s nonsensical adaptation of charts from Clay
Christensen’s The Innovator’s Dilemma,
a standard in the innovation literature.
Pierce employs his own versions of
Christensen’s charts but leaves out certain key elements, with the result that
the reader has no hope of making sense
of them. This will give the knowledgeable reader serious doubt regarding the
validity of the book.
However, things get better as Pierce
swings into the case studies. He contrasts successful attempts to institutionalize disruptive innovations, like the
Marine Corps shift to offensive amphibious warfare doctrine in the 1930s,
with such failed efforts as Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt’s Project 60, an attempt
to refocus the Navy on sea control.
Pierce also compares the management
methods used to promote sustaining innovations, such as continuous-aim
gunfire, with those successful in promoting disruptive innovations, and he
finds significant differences. In the end,
a degree of clarity is attained, and by
the final chapter the reader can with
some effort understand and even agree
with the author’s main arguments. In
fact, people engaged in military innovation efforts will likely find some practical insights.
If, then, this book, despite its flaws, can
be useful for the knowledgeable military officer, academic, or defense industry manager, it is most definitely not for
the uninitiated or casual reader. Ultimately, it is too hard to follow and contains too many editing errors to be
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recommended as a worthwhile investment for the general reader. It is too
bad that neither Pierce’s advisers nor
his publisher extended the effort to review and edit his dissertation properly;
it could have had far wider appeal and
value.
ROBERT C. RUBEL

Naval War College

Gladwell, Malcolm. Blink: The Power of Thinking
without Thinking. New York: Little, Brown, 2005.
277pp. $15.57

Among the many attributes desired in
professional military officers is the ability to make extremely rapid decisions
under conditions of extreme stress and
peril, and for the highest imaginable
stakes. Decisions may even have to be
made in less time than is available consciously to weigh the alternatives and
select a course of action. Although not
unique—others, including doctors, law
enforcement officials, and firefighters,
face similar situations and under equivalent expectations—such demands are
not a common part of most people’s
work experience.
In Blink Gladwell examines rapid, almost instantaneous, decision making—
decisions made in the “blink of an eye.”
The book advances an intriguing and
seductive proposition, that people can
be trained to make nearly instantaneous
decisions using minimal amounts of
data and yet achieve remarkable percentages of successful outcomes. If
reading Blink could produce such a result, the book would represent one of
the most significant advances in the
field of decision making in decades.
Unfortunately, such is not the case.
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Blink is not going to transform its readers into paragons of successful, instant
decision makers, however much the
dust-jacket hype might imply it will.
However, this does not mean Blink
should be completely written off. There
are insights worth thinking about and lessons to be gleaned from Gladwell’s work.
For the most part, Blink is an extremely
reader-friendly volume. Gladwell introduces concepts and follows up with
deeper illumination and understanding
through a variety of well documented
anecdotes. During the first half of the
book, the author seems about to deliver
on the implied promise of better decision making as he explains how some
people seem to master what might be
called the “art of snap decisions.” He
does this in graduated steps, providing
convincing evidence for each component of his argument.
Drawing on data from a study of gambling, Gladstone demonstrates that decision making occurs in both the
human conscious and the subconscious
mind. The gambling study found that at
least in some people subconscious decision making occurs more rapidly than
conscious decision making. Blink also
provides convincing evidence that distilling, rather than increasing, information may result in not only faster but
better decision making. The combination of subconscious data processing
and the use of very limited data is
known as “thin-slicing,” defined as “the
ability of the unconscious to find patterns in situations based on very narrow
slices of experience.” A related illustrative anecdote comes from the medical
community. Doctors have determined
that confining an examination to four
key observations results in significantly
higher percentages of correct diagnosis
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of heart attack in the emergency room
than do more comprehensive diagnostic protocols.
Blink identifies experience as another
key component in the ability to make
rapid and accurate decisions. Deep familiarity with one’s subject, be it ancient Greek statues, professional tennis,
marriage counseling, or, one may assume, battle displays, is an essential
component to making correct fast decisions. To demonstrate this point
Gladwell offers the example of Vic
Braden, a noted tennis coach who apparently has a supernatural ability to
predict when a professional tennis
player is going to double-fault. Yet
Braden cannot explain how he knows
the double fault will occur. Clearly decades of coaching tennis have left him
with a predictive ability that functions
either so rapidly or so subconsciously
that he himself does not understand it.
Gladwell also explores the negative aspects of thin-slice decision making. Everybody makes lightning decisions, all
of us work off hunches and feelings, but
all too often the decisions are influenced by images and stereotypes that
have bombarded us from birth. One of
the most powerful questions raised in
Blink concerns the degree to which our
attitudes on such fundamental questions as racial equality are answered
through snap decision making. According to Gladwell the answer is “to a very
large extent,” so much so that people
who sincerely believe they are not biased carry embedded subconscious attitudes that affect their perceptions of
others. Interestingly, Blink suggests
such attitudes do not have to be permanent, that exposure to positive images
can result in measurable changes to
subconscious perceptions. If true, these
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findings would seem not only to give
significant ammunition to those who
claim the nation’s children are excessively influenced by what they see on
television but to have importance in efforts to counter terrorist attempts to
popularize their ideologies.
Another reported pitfall to good snap
decision making is the power of the first
impression. Gladwell tells the story of
Warren Harding, a man whose bearing
and voice so impressed all who met him
with their presidential quality that it
seemed only right he should attain the
Oval Office. Unfortunately, Harding’s
capabilities did not match his image,
and his time in the White House was
thoroughly undistinguished. In one of
the book’s more interesting anecdotes
Gladwell explains the success behind
the so-called “Pepsi Challenge,” a blind
taste-test designed to help the Pepsi
Cola Company achieve a victory over
its primary competitor, Coca-Cola. Being sweeter tasting than Coke, Pepsi
was overwhelmingly favored when individuals sampled small amounts of each
soda. The results were reversed, however, when the sample size was increased
to an entire can. The Coca-Cola Company failed to realize this fact and diverted significant resources into a variety
of failed attempts to meet the “challenge.”
Much of Blink is devoted to the performance of retired Marine general Paul
Van Riper as the commander of opposition forces in the MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE war game of 2002. This game
simulated a massive U.S. military response to a rogue military leader in the
Persian Gulf. General Van Riper reportedly scored an impressive victory
against U.S. forces early in the game by
a variety of innovative and unexpected
tactics. Gladwell argues Van Riper was
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victorious because his team, unencumbered by excessive information and
overanalysis, retained the power of
rapid cognition. In other words, rather
than relying on technology and analysis
to eliminate the fog of war, General
Van Riper’s team had been trained to
work in the fog; his unexpected tactics
plunged the U.S. military and political
analysts into the very fog they had intended to dispel. Once both sides were
operating in conditions of reduced clarity,
Van Riper’s team was able to triumph.
The remainder of the book examines in
some detail the death of Amadou Diallo,
a Guinean immigrant who was shot to
death by members of a New York Police
Department street-crime unit in 1999.
Gladwell walks the reader through the
shooting, presenting the police officers
not as slavering racists or sociopaths but
as victims of their own physiological responses to stress and a lack of training
under high-stress conditions. According
to Gladwell’s research, as stress reaches
extreme levels, such as in “shoot/don’t
shoot” situations, the human body
changes the way it processes and perceives
data. Under these conditions, signals,
perhaps especially facial expressions, no
longer carry the impact they would otherwise; humans enter a state the book
identifies as “mind-blind,” a condition
that might also be described as temporary
autism. The odds skyrocket that the affected individual, robbed of the ability to
process key data rapidly, will opt to shoot
a perceived threat. However, Gladwell explains, with training these automatic responses become less severe, allowing
individuals to make accurate and appropriate decisions. Blink argues that an even
more desirable outcome of proper training is to prevent such high-stress situations from developing in the first place.
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Surprisingly, Gladwell concludes his
book with a story that showcases the
negative side of first impressions,
thin-slicing, and stereotypes—the impressive increase in the number of
women in professional orchestras. This
growth, especially in sections of the orchestra traditionally thought of as masculine, is attributed less to a growing
awareness of women’s rights than to the
introduction of “blind auditions,” in
which the applicants perform out of the
judges’ sight. Deprived of immediate
decision cues, the judges are forced to
base their decisions solely on musical
merit. Artificial or nonmusical impediments are removed, and women musicians are free to rise to their level of
competence. As examples go, this is
compelling in the extreme.
The merits of Blink are many. It is well
written, lively, and engaging. Gladwell
both explains the power of first impressions and demonstrates that there are
indeed people who can make very successful decisions based on minimal data
in next to no time. He also convinces
that such talents can be acquired, or at
least improved. Yet it is here that the
book loses cohesion and momentum.
Having recognized that “blink” decision making can be both positive and
negative, Gladwell offers no clear way
by which the former can be improved
and the latter minimized. Furthermore,
the people he identifies as good “blink”
decision makers are all experts. In many
cases they have been mastering their
fields for decades. For example, General
Van Riper’s success was due at least as
much to his expert knowledge of U.S.
military procedures, strategy, and tactics as it was to his ability to make snap
decisions. It is a pity Gladwell did not
pursue the question of experience
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a little deeper as, at least upon the surface,
his findings would seem to have applicability to such issues as officer-training
pipelines and criteria for command.
The fact that training can reduce the
negative impacts of stress in snap decision making is nothing new, especially
for those in the military. Whether it is
the Marines reacting to a convoy ambush or a warship’s combat systems
team responding to an air attack, realistic training is a critical component of
success. Gladwell’s work simply reinforces what soldiers and sailors have
long known: You fight the way you train.
While Blink will not make its readers
experts at snap decisions, it remains a
work of interest. For one thing Gladwell
rather conclusively demonstrates that
our individual personalities, our unique
experiences, and beliefs and values,
form an integral part of human decision making. Models that fail to take
this aspect of decision making into consideration are almost certain to be
flawed, and leaders who fail to understand the power of these attributes are
almost certain to be disappointed. Blink
may not provide all the answers, but the
questions it raises are most definitely
worthy of consideration.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Miller, Steven E., and Dimitri V. Trenin, eds. The
Russian Military: Power and Purpose. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2004. 241pp. $25

The study of the Russian armed forces
has, like those armed forces themselves,
fallen upon hard times in the contemporary world. Therefore, this study is most
welcome. The editors and authors—
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Americans, Europeans, and Russians—
are all acknowledged experts, so it is
not surprising that all the essays are of
uniformly high quality. The editors also
deserve praise for including a chapter
on the defense economy; its evolution is
a telling indicator of Russia’s defense
policy and overall political economy.
The editors’ purpose is to illuminate
the conditions under which Russia’s
rulers have responded to the challenges
for reforming their armed forces.
Thus the chapters on defense reform
(by Pavel Baev and Alexei Arbatov) and
on the military’s sociopolitical conditions (by Alexander Golts) paint a devastating picture of an unreformed
military that instead of providing security has itself become a source of insecurity for Russia. That outcome stems
from underinvestment, politicization,
corruption, official neglect, and refusal
to attack the perquisites of the military
establishment’s leadership. Vitaly
Shlykov’s chapter on the defense economy rightly points out that the regime
has failed to break free of either the Soviet Union’s “structural militarization”
or the heavy hand of state control. Roy
Allison’s overview of Russian military
involvement in regional conflicts suggests that even after painful lessons that
military has only begun to learn what
contemporary warfare is all about. Rose
Gottemoeller ably traces both the debate over the role of nuclear forces in
Russia’s military structure and policy
through 2003 and the implications of
that debate as they had been revealed at
that point. Dmitri Trenin’s conclusion
reassesses the reasons why defense reform had failed through 2003 and addresses the paradox that though many
are calling for reforms, many others
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correctly observe that the system itself
is unreformable.
No one interested in tracing the evolution of Russian forces and defense policy through 2003 can go wrong with
this book. It is too bad that it was published when it was. Because this work is
part of a distinguished multivolume series on Eurasian security issues, its publication was part of a larger program
and could not be delayed, but beginning in 2003 and conclusively in 2004,
the logjam that had blocked reform began to give way. Defense spending and
training, including exercises, increased
substantially, and by 2004 the effects
were visible. Likewise, new operational
and doctrinal principles were introduced and accepted in 2003–2004. The
General Staff, which had frustrated
many reforms, was now firmly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, and
the chief of the General Staff, General
Anatoly Kvashnin, a tenacious bureaucratic operator but disastrous military
leader, was finally sacked. Major forcestructure reforms began and are still
continuing today. Had the authors
known of these trends, they could have
provided first-class assessments of their
significance.
However, some things are already clear.
Current reforms are occurring under
the rubric of the Russian term “reform
of the armed forces”—that is, changes
in force structure. These reforms, while
extremely consequential, do not constitute a total transformation. Indeed, the
defense economy remains too much of
a Soviet-like character and is subject to
excessive state control. All the armed
forces, including those of the Ministry
of Interior and intelligence agencies, are
unaccountable democratically, representing instead indispensable pillars of
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Putin’s neo-tsarist, authoritarian system.
In addition, the Ministry of Defense,
rather than embracing a professional
army, insists upon expanding conscription and enserfing thousands of men as
their ancestors were enserfed over a
century ago. Thus, until and unless defense reforms are carried out beyond
mere reorganizations of the force structure, Russia cannot have effective
armed forces, security, or democracy.
Until then it will remain tempted by
imperialism and military adventurism,
as in Chechnya, and fail to retrieve its
European vocation or achieve true integration into Europe. Under the circumstances, then, it would be a good idea if
the authors could be prevailed upon to
write a second edition that incorporates
the most recent trends. Then we could
derive maximum benefit from this splendid book that was published too soon.
STEPHEN BLANK

Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Penna.

Mallmann Showell, Jak P. German Naval Codebreakers. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2003. 160pp. $29.95

In the almost thirty years since the public revelation that the Allies in World
War II broke substantial portions of the
German ENIGMA cipher system, Allied
codebreaking has become a staple of
our understanding of the Battle of the
Atlantic. Less understood are the parallel efforts of the German navy to break
Allied naval codes. The historical record of German codebreaking is comparatively fragmentary, many records
having been destroyed during or immediately after the war. German naval
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intelligence was smaller than its Allied
counterparts and left a smaller trace.
Still, the influence of these German efforts on the pivotal convoy battles of
the war has remained an important unanswered question. In German Naval
Codebreakers, Jak Showell, author of
more than a dozen books on German
U-boats, has attempted to provide an
account of signals intelligence in the
German navy in World War II.
The German Naval Radio Monitoring
Service (or Funkbeobachtungsdienst,
commonly abbreviated B-Dienst)
worked with some success against British and American naval codes. During
the early period of the war until 1943,
the B-Dienst could read large parts of
the Allied merchant ship and convoy
codes, which provided important insights into convoy operations and routing. In addition to codebreaking,
B-Dienst operated a network of direction finders that fixed the approximate
locations of radio transmissions in the
Atlantic.
Whatever its success at codebreaking,
the German navy in World War II
failed at the critical second step of intelligence analysis. Showell creates the impression that B-Dienst personnel were
separated from key operational commanders and were not permitted access
to information about their own forces’
operations. The B-Dienst was therefore
reduced to passing raw messages to senior commands, feeding the complaint
that radio intelligence served only to
provide a flood of useless information.
This arrangement stands in marked
contrast to the intimate relationship between commanders and operational intelligence centers in Britain and the
United States.
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From the outset, the book suffers from
an unfortunate organization. Attempting to avoid a chronological history of the war at sea, the author has
arranged his material in a series of short
vignettes, separated by ship type and
area of operations. Lost in this organization is the common thread of the
B-Dienst itself. Showell, for example,
touches on the question of how intelligence support was provided to German
units at sea in several sections but never
ties them together to address the critical
question of information dissemination
across the German navy. Showell attempts to circumvent this problem by a
series of appendixes on organization,
but these are too brief to serve the need,
and the result is confusing and unclear.
Within these sections there are historical gems. For example, the author discusses a February 1943 incident in
which the B-Dienst intercepted a British message containing German submarine locations—potential evidence that
the German code was itself being read
by the Allies. Ultimately, the German
navy convinced itself that its operational information had been compromised through other means and that its
codes were secure. However, this gem,
like all others mentioned, suffers from
the second major failing of the book—
an almost complete lack of documentation. While the work contains a list of
recommended reading and mentions at
the outset that it is largely based on
work found in private archives in Germany, there is no further reference to
the evidence.
The third and perhaps most important
failing of the book is a failure to explore
the full implications of German successes and failures. The fundamental
historical question is how the German
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navy set out to provide intelligence information to its commanders, and how
and why it succeeded or failed in that
effort. That question is never answered,
leaving the book at best titillating but
unsatisfying.
DALE C. RIELAGE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Assistant Naval Attaché, Berlin

McCullough, David. 1776. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2005. 386pp. $32

David McCullough has written yet another enormously enjoyable and informative narrative history. Compared to
his monumental Pulitzer Prize–winning
biographies of Harry Truman and John
Adams, 1776 is only a snapshot of a
crucial moment in time, although it is
every bit as engaging. It covers the
events of the seventeen months between
King George III’s October 1775 announcement to Parliament of unrelenting war against his American colonies
and the arrival in Britain of the news of
George Washington’s victory at Trenton in March 1777. A story of overcoming adversity, 1776 focuses on the early
battles of the War of Independence,
which were mainly retreats for the ragged and often exhausted Continental
Army.
Based on McCullough’s expert research
in American and British archives, the
story is packed with rich descriptions
drawn from both sources. At age fortyfour, Washington is at the moral center of the drama. Although he had
never before led an army in battle and
is (as McCullough bluntly declares)
“indecisive and inept” in the early New
York campaigns, Washington learns
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from his mistakes and somehow keeps
his frayed army intact and unbroken.
He also proves to be resolute as well as
resilient, living up to his later reputation as the “indispensable man” of the
founding era.
McCullough vibrantly describes other
indispensable characters as well. On the
American side there are Henry Knox, a
“town-born” Boston bookseller turned
accomplished soldier at age twenty-five,
and Nathaniel Greene, a “fighting
Quaker” who became the youngest brigadier general in the army at age
thirty-three. Both these men proved to
be outstanding military leaders and
steadfastly loyal to Washington. Leaders
from the British side are also crisply
portrayed. King George III, his primary
military commanders General William
Howe and Admiral Lord Richard
Howe, and other diligent subjects of the
Crown are sketched, in a fresh and balanced treatment.
The Howe brothers, who were directed
by King George to extend the “olive
branch” as well as fight (perhaps explaining some of their dawdling maneuvers), are painted as courageous and
dedicated professionals. They commanded an awesome force, and the
vivid descriptions of raw British
power—an armada of four hundred
ships anchored off Staten Island, the ferocious British bombardment at Kips
Bay that began the battle for New
York—are truly daunting. The fighting
was vicious and large in scale, and
many readers will have to be reminded
that forty thousand people took part in
the battle for Long Island, a fight that
stretched over six miles through presentday Brooklyn.
McCullough solidly grounds his narrative at the individual level. Utilizing
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firsthand accounts from diaries and letters, and writing in a graceful style, he
humanizes the stories of the lesser characters of those times that did indeed
“try men’s souls.” Volunteer farmers,
artisans, backwoodsmen, tradesmen,
boatmen, and mere boys, all accustomed to hardship and labor, make up
the cast. There are patriot “shoemakers,
saddlers, carpenters, wheelwrights,
blacksmiths, coopers, tailors and ship
chandlers,” as well as their counterpart
Loyalists—and the splendidly trained
but equally human redcoats and
Hessians. McCullough’s colorful story
includes drunks, deserters, spies, prostitutes, traitors, and no-accounts, along
with the accompanying bad teeth,
smallpox scars, casts in the eyes, open
“necessaries” (latrines), and “camp fever” (dysentery and typhus). The story
also describes instances of astonishing
dedication, ingenuity, energy, heroism,
and self-sacrifice for the “glorious
cause.”
McCullough’s story ends with Washington’s crossing of the Delaware and
the victory at Trenton, the battle that
gave the first great hope for the cause
after the British evacuation of Boston in
1775. It was the “brilliant stroke” that
Washington had sought. Fate and
chance played a weighty role; a slight
change in the wind, the arrival of fog,
the amount of gunpowder, or in the
timing of British pursuit could have
doomed the rebellion. The eventual victory was even then far from inevitable
and was to be indeed a near-run thing.
The British historian Sir George
Trevelyan once wrote of the astounding
turnaround after Trenton, “It may be
doubted whether so small a number of
men ever employed so short a space of
time with greater and more lasting
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effects upon the history of the world.”
McCullough’s superb book will convince the reader of this view; the author
himself concludes that the outcome
seemed “little short of a miracle.”

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss1/8

Perhaps Washington said it best when
he wrote, “perseverance and spirit have
done wonders in all ages.”
WILLIAM CALHOUN

Naval War College
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